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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a framework for corporate financial disclosure measurement to identify 
and evaluate measures of financial disclosure employed in prior empirical accounting studies. 
It identifies two approaches: (i) a disclosure-based approach that investigates actual 
disclosure, operationalizes the concept of disclosure in terms of its main dimensions such as 
the quantity and quality of disclosure, and develops methods to measure them such as the 
disclosure index and textual analysis, and (ii) a non-disclosure-based approach that uses the 
values of some observable variables to proxy for disclosure such as market-based disclosure 
measures. The study also discusses the extent to which the reliability and validity of these 
different measures of disclosure are tested. The purposes of this review are: (i) to help future 
researchers identify exemplars and select or develop their own suitable disclosure measures, 
and (ii) to identify measurement issues relating to corporate financial disclosure and provide 
avenues for future research.  
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Corporate financial disclosure1 is any deliberate release of financial information, 
whether numerical or qualitative, required or voluntary, via formal or informal channels 
(Gibbins, Richardson, & Waterhouse, 1990, p. 122). Companies disclose information2 through 
various means such as annual reports, conference calls, interim reports, prospectuses, press 
releases, and websites. Prior empirical accounting studies have attempted to develop various 
measures for financial disclosure, but to date there is no comprehensive systematic review 
that identifies and evaluates these measures. This paper addresses this gap and develops a 
framework for financial disclosure measurement based on a review of 280 prior empirical 
studies published in top rated accounting journals. 
Financial disclosure is important because it is the primary means of communication 
between management and outside investors as well as market participants in general. Hence 
the literature on financial disclosure is enormous and investigates a wide range of issues such 
as the determinants of voluntary disclosure, the impact of regulatory change on the extent of 
disclosure, and the economic consequences of disclosure. Although many studies investigate 
financial disclosure for the private sector companies, others look at the public sector and not-
for-profit organizations. In all these studies, disclosure plays a key role and must be measured 
in some way. However, measuring disclosure is difficult because disclosure is a theoretical 
construct which is not directly observable. 
                                        
1 Some researchers refer to the numbers in the financial statements as “financial reporting”. Other scholars view 
numbers outside the financial statements and texts as “disclosure”. Others view both these types as financial 
disclosure (e.g., Gibbins et al., 1990). We belong to the third school and adopt Gibbins et al.’s (1990) definition 
of corporate financial disclosure, which covers both the numbers in the financial statements and other numbers as 
well as texts in the disclosure vehicle. 
2 Corporate disclosure can also be directed to parties other than outside investors, such as stakeholders more 
generally, strategic investors, and strategic debtholders.  
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Previous review articles discuss several ways of measuring disclosure, by looking at 
either one method or one type of disclosure. For example, Marston and Shrives (1991) 
concentrate on the disclosure index, whereas Jones and Shoemaker (1994) examine textual 
analysis techniques. Healy and Palepu (2001) discuss concerns about measuring voluntary 
disclosure and consider the disadvantages of three measurement proxies: management 
forecasts, analyst ratings, and self-constructed disclosure indices developed by researchers. 
They consider that analyst ratings and self-constructed disclosure indices are likely to be 
noisy3 measures of disclosure.  
Beattie, McInnes, and Fearnley (2004) present a selection of methods for measuring 
narratives in annual reports, including methods reviewed by Jones and Shoemaker (1994) as 
well as Healy and Palepu (2001). Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) expand on this list 
and include properties of reported earnings. Leuz and Wysocki (2016) enlarge this list and 
include binary indicators and frequency of disclosure. Table 1 provides an overview of the 
measures of disclosure identified in these studies; however, our study provides a more 
comprehensive review and discussion of various methods for measuring disclosure, and 
further extends the list to include measurements of disclosure through other observable 
variables such as market-based measures and the voluntary adoption of generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP). It goes further by developing a framework for corporate 
financial disclosure measurement and discussing some related measurement issues. The 
purpose of this framework is to provide a consistent approach for systematically collecting, 
analyzing, and evaluating existent measures of financial disclosure. We hope this will help 
                                        
3 Healy and Palepu (2001) consider that using these measures of disclosure as independent variables in prior 
studies are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. 
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researchers to make more informed decisions about their choices of measures of financial 
disclosure or allow them to locate any new measure or method that they develop. 
<<Insert Table 1 about here>> 
Current gaps in the disclosure literature provide several motivations for our study. 
Firstly, a framework for disclosure measurement does not currently exist in the literature. 
Accounting studies do not specifically consider issues involved in measuring disclosure as a 
latent (unobservable) variable. Secondly, although this literature offers a variety of potential 
measures for disclosure, to date, there is no comprehensive systematic review that identifies 
and evaluates existent measures of disclosure. Thirdly, although the assessment of measures 
of disclosure is discussed to some extent in the extant accounting literature, a comprehensive 
analysis is lacking. Our study contributes to the literature by filling in these gaps through (i) 
developing a framework for corporate financial disclosure measurement, (ii) identifying and 
evaluating common measures of financial disclosure employed in prior empirical studies 
through a review of the literature from 2005 to 2016, and (iii) providing an in-depth discussion 
of some related empirical challenges including casual claims, and how the reliability and 
validity of different measures of disclosure are assessed. The purpose of this review is to help 
future researchers to identify exemplars and to guide them in the selection or development 
of their own suitable measures. Additionally, our study highlights some measurement issues 
related to corporate financial disclosure and provides avenues for future research. 
A review of the empirical accounting literature was conducted to identify measures of 
financial disclosure employed in articles published between 2005 and 2016; articles in 
accountancy journals that are rated 3* or 4* by the Association of Business Schools were 
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investigated.4 We believe that selecting articles from top rated accounting journals over a 12-
year period provides a reasonably up-to-date time frame for this review. Employing a Boolean 
search for ‘financial reporting’ or ‘financial disclosure’, on the title, abstract and keywords 
fields of the selected journals over the selected time frame, the results show 2514 articles 
published between 2005 and 2016. The titles, abstracts and conclusions were then carefully 
read to identify empirical studies of corporate financial disclosure/reporting in the private 
sector. We excluded5 the following studies: intellectual capital studies, timely disclosure 
studies, research that empirically examines the economic consequences of individual items 
of financial disclosure, and image/picture disclosure studies. The application of these research 
criteria yielded a sample of 280 disclosure studies. Table 2 presents a break-down of these 
studies by journal and shows that most of them are published in the Accounting Review, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, and the International 
Journal of Accounting. 
 <<Insert Table 2 about here>> 
We followed an inductive reasoning approach to develop a framework for disclosure 
measurement. From specific observations about measurements of disclosure developed in 
the empirical accounting literature, the analysis moves onto broader generalizations. To 
inform our analysis, we also consulted the literature on the problem associated with 
measurement of latent variables (Jarvis, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003; Goertz, 2008). We 
                                        
4 This choice may seem biased toward US academic journals. The Association of Business Schools rankings are 
heavily used in the UK during the selection of academic staff and articles to be entered in the periodic Research 
Excellence Framework exercise by which UK University departments are ranked. US–based, highly quantitative 
journals are predominant in these rankings. However, in the first version of this paper prior to our systematic 
review, we did not apply any restrictions to the academic papers covered, and we reached similar conclusions 
about common financial disclosure measures in the accounting literature. 




identified, evaluated and coded the different types of disclosure measures contained within 
the 280 studies and categorized them into 11 common measures of disclosure. These 
measures of disclosure are then classified into disclosure-based and non-disclosure-based 
measures.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we develop a 
framework for disclosure measurement and identify as well as evaluate different measures 
of disclosure. In Section 3 we discuss causal claims in prior disclosure studies and explore the 
extent to which reliability and validity of measures of disclosure are tested within papers 
identified in the systematic review of the literature. Finally, in section 4 we discuss some 
measurement issues relating to financial disclosure and highlight areas for future research. 
2. A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCLOSURE MEASUREMENT 
In this section, we develop a framework to classify various measures of disclosure. To 
do this, either a deductive or an inductive reasoning approach can be followed.  
A deductive reasoning approach works from the more general to the more specific, 
informally called a “top-down” approach. Applying the deductive approach when 
constructing or evaluating concepts and quantitative measures, Goertz (2008) suggests, 
among other things, that the first consideration must be the theory embodied in the concept. 
Another consideration should be the necessary (minimum) and sufficient (maximum) parts of 
the concept. However, there is no single theory of disclosure (Verrecchia, 2001), which makes 
it more complex to develop or evaluate a measure of disclosure. Additionally, empirical 
studies consider different types of disclosure, for example mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures. Also, financial disclosure can take different formats such as textual or numerical 
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disclosure (e.g., Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Nelson & Rupar, 2015). This deductive approach is 
even more complex when we consider that within a single type of disclosure there are 
different dimensions that can be captured such as the quality and quantity of information 
disclosure (e.g., Wynn, 2008; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; André, Filip, & Moldovan, 2016). 
For all these reasons, it is probably impossible to adopt a deductive approach to disclosure 
measurement. 
Alternatively, an inductive reasoning approach can be employed to develop a 
framework for disclosure measurement. Inductive reasoning is a type of thinking that involves 
identifying patterns in a data set to reach conclusions and build theories (Hair, Wolfinbarger, 
Money, & Samouel, 2011, p. 276). It moves from specific observations to broader 
generalizations and theories, informally called a “bottom-up” approach. Using this approach, 
we review 280 empirical accounting studies published in top rated accounting journals from 
2005 to 2016 and identify6 common proxies employed for financial disclosure. Table 3 shows 
a list of the common measures of disclosure identified in the review of the literature and 
provides some exemplars for each measure. It shows 11 different measures of financial 
disclosure with the classification approach being the most popular, while the disclosure 
survey (analyst ratings) and the voluntary adoption of quality GAAP are the least popular 
method employed in the recent empirical accounting literature.  
                                        
6 Since human coding is inevitably subjective, to ensure the reliability of our coding, the authors of the papers 
have agreed on the coding instructions of the different measures of disclosure before the coding took place. When 
in doubt, the same paper would be coded by both authors and any discrepancies were discussed and resolved. In 
addition, after the coding was finalized, a random sample of 40 papers has been re-coded (test-retest) by one of 
the authors. The recoding of measures of corporate financial disclosure was almost identical to the original ones, 




 <<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
Analyzing these common measures of disclosure, we identify two main measurement 
methods: a disclosure-based approach and a non-disclosure-based approach. A further 
classification7 relates to whether the non-disclosure-based measure is a formative or 
reflective variable.  
2.1 Disclosure-based approach 
This approach investigates actual disclosure and reduces (operationalizes) it to its 
main dimensions such as quantity, quality, timing, complexity, tone and prominence. It 
attempts to measure one or more of these dimensions via various means such as textual 
analysis or the disclosure index approach. Table 4 provides a summary of common disclosure-
based measures identified in this review of the literature. 
 <<Insert Table 4 about here>> 
2.1.1 Classification approach 
This approach involves sorting observations into mutually exclusive groups according 
to an aspect of corporate financial disclosure that is being studied. The focus could be broad 
such as a disclosure policy or a reporting regime, for example whether a firm publicly provide 
an annual report or files a 10-K report, or narrow such as specific disclosure, for example 
whether a firm hosts conference calls or provides management forecasts (Leuz & Wysocki, 
                                        
7 We acknowledge that some overlap inevitably exists between the sub-clusters. For example, textual analysis 
methods can be employed to create textual sentiments, but to recognize that sentiment analysis is not limited to 
written words only and that it can be employed on quantitative data, we prefer to address it as a separate sub-




2016). Then, it uses a categorical variable to represent these groups in numerical terms. The 
resultant measure of corporate financial disclosure could be dichotomous or multicategory. 
For example, Cannizzaro and Weiner (2015) classify disclosures into minimal, partial, and full 
disclosure to assess transparency. Marquardt and Wiedman (2007) measure the quality of 
disclosure by classifying information on contingently convertible securities to “high-quality” 
if the number of shares related to the convertible securities is disclosed; “medium-quality” if 
enough information is provided for investors to calculate the dilutive impact; and “low-
quality” if insufficient information is provided. Gillan and Panasian (2014) sort firms into cross-
listed (foreign) firms filing a 40-F, 20-F, 10-K form, or their US-matched domestic counterparts 
to capture the differential disclosure complexity in these filings. Hollander et al. (2010) assess 
incomplete disclosure by determining whether requests for information made during 
conference calls are granted. If at least one request is not granted, they mark this call as 
containing incomplete disclosure.  Bowen et al. (2005), Files, Swanson, and Tse (2009), and 
Marques (2010) assess the prominence of disclosure using a classification approach based on 
the position of information in the disclosure vehicle. 
 A classification approach is commonly applied to specific disclosures such as 
conference calls, segment information, management forecasts, disclosure of non-GAAP 
numbers, material restatement and material weakness disclosures, and financial statement 
disclosure (e.g., Kimbrough, 2005; Botosan & Stanford, 2005; Marques, 2006; Nagy, 2010; 
Weiss, 2014; Bernard, 2016). However, given the simplicity of this approach, it can be applied 
to any type of disclosure.  
The data have the advantages of being relatively time-efficient to collect and code and 
can be used for large-scale samples. This might explain the popularity of this method among 
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prior studies with 112 cases identified in the current systematic review of the literature. This 
approach is able to capture one type of disclosure at a time (e.g., voluntary, or mandatory) in 
contrast to other methods which fail to separate between these two types of disclosure such 
as disclosure survey and market-based measures. In addition, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) argue 
that this approach focuses on the existence of certain disclosures and hence disclosure can 
be precisely measured. Perhaps this is true when the focus of the measure is narrow, but still 
other disclosure activities might act as a substitute or a complement which need to be 
controlled for in the research design. When the focus of the measure is broad, however, at 
best they only partition companies into mutually exclusive groups (with some sort of order 
emerging if ordinal variables are employed), without any attempt to capture differences in 
the dimension of disclosure among companies that belong to the same group. In addition, 
coding could be subjective, in particular when weights are assigned, and hence results could 
be difficult to replicate, compare and generalize. 
2.1.2 Disclosure index 
A disclosure index8 is a research instrument used to assess the extent of information 
reported in a disclosure vehicle(s) by a specific entity according to a list of selected items of 
information. The items of information could be quantitative or qualitative or both. It can be 
applied to different types of disclosures: mandatory or voluntary; or even to a specific type of 
                                        
8 Both the disclosure index method and textual analysis could be generally viewed as sub-types of content analysis 
because we are trying to draw valuable information from the data to the context of their use (Krippendorff, 1980). 
However, these two methods differ from each other in several aspects. For example, the unit of analysis under the 
disclosure index method could be figures or texts or both, while the unit of analysis under textual analysis is texts 
only. Using a disclosure index method, the researcher assesses whether disclosures have been made about some 
selected items of information, in contrast to the commonly used bag-of-words methods in textual analysis, for 
example, where the focus is on word count or word frequency, and where word sequence is ignored. Furthermore, 
while only human coding is used to develop disclosure scores using a disclosure index method, textual analysis 




disclosure such as management forecasts and segmental data. It does not count all items of 
information disclosed, but rather assesses whether disclosures have been made about the 
selected items of information through a close reading of the disclosure vehicle. Thus, the 
selection of items to include in the disclosure index is a key issue with this approach (Marston 
& Shrives, 1991). It can also be extended to assess the usefulness of information provided by 
awarding scores on an ordinal scale (e.g., 0/1/2/3) for disclosures of each item in a list (e.g., 
disclosures that contain quantitative data or report more information would receive a higher 
score than a minimal level of disclosure). However, the assignment of weights is itself subject 
to conceptual and procedural problems (e.g., Dhaliwal, 1980; Cooke & Wallace, 1989; 
Hodgdon et al., 2009; Cheung, Jiang, & Tan, 2010). The first use of such an index was by Cerf 
in 1961, and the method has been widely employed ever since (Marston & Shrives, 1991).  
A disclosure index can be developed by the researcher (self-constructed disclosure 
indices) or developed externally by an academic or professional body (existing disclosure 
indices) such as Standard and Poor’s transparency and disclosure scores, US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) ratings of the management discussion and analysis disclosure, 
the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) disclosure scores, and 
the Joint Society of Management Accountants of Canada/University of Quebec and Montreal 
disclosure scores. Our review finds that the disclosure index approach is one of the most 
popular measures of disclosure; it is used in a variety of contexts indicating how flexible the 
method is. From our review of the literature, 50 cases were identified, including self-
constructed disclosure indices as well as existing disclosure indices. A more detailed analysis 
reveals that most studies use self-constructed disclosure indices with data extracted from 
company reports and websites (e.g., Webb, Cahan, & Sun, 2008; Hodgdon et al., 2009; Melis 
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et al., 2015; Mangena et al., 2016; Bazrafshan, Kandelousi, & Hooy, 2016), but some use the 
CIFAR index (e.g., Guedhami & Pittman, 2006; Han et al., 2012) or Standard and Poor’s 
transparency and disclosure scores (e.g., Dargenidou et al., 2006; Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 
2007).  
Self–constructed disclosure indices have the advantage that they can be designed to 
fit the project (e.g., country, voluntary and/or mandatory disclosure, disclosure topic). 
However, the use of existing disclosure indices saves time, and results can be compared with 
the findings from other studies. Self-constructed disclosure index studies generally employ 
small samples owing to the labor-intensive data collection process, and results obtained are 
often difficult to replicate, compare and generalize (Hassan, Romilly, Giorgioni, & Power, 
2009; Beyer et al., 2010). In addition, the construction of a disclosure index in prior studies 
often fails to explicitly account for the incremental information content of each new data item 
added to the index. Future research may develop an approach that can better capture the 
incremental information content of additional items of information disclosed by means of 
data reduction techniques such as factor analysis and principal component analysis. 
Furthermore, the appropriate method of aggregation is also of relevance here. For example, 
two companies may have disclosed completely different sets of information within the 
disclosure index and receive the same disclosure score.  
2.1.3 Disclosure count 
This approach counts the number of distinctive disclosures usually, but not 
necessarily, without evaluating their content or context. For example, the number of press 
releases (Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008), the frequency of disclosure of non- GAAP earnings 
measures over a period of time  (Marques, 2010), the number of online announcements 
14 
 
(Debreceny & Rahman, 2005), the number of segments reported by a firm (Kou & Hussain, 
2007), and the number of internal control weaknesses reported by a firm in its Management 
Discussion & Analysis (Lu et al., 2011). This approach usually relates to particular types of 
disclosure such as conference calls, management forecasts, disclosure of non-GAAP numbers, 
information about material restatements and weakness, and segmental data (e.g., Rogers & 
Van Buskirk, 2009; Bergman & Roychowdhury, 2008; Marques, 2006; Lu et al., 2011; Kou & 
Hussain, 2007). It is frequently used in conjunction with a classification approach (e.g., Ge & 
McVay, 2005; Wasley & Wu, 2006; Francis et al., 2008; Levine & Smith, 2011). 
Our systematic review shows that disclosure count is one of the most popular 
measures of disclosure with 36 cases identified from the articles analyzed. It is commonly 
used to measure the quantity of disclosure (Francis et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2012; Baginski, 
Clinton, & Mcguire, 2014), but it has also been used to assess other dimensions of disclosure 
such as quality (Sengupta & Zhang, 2015), the quantity and quality of disclosure (Wynn, 2008; 
Cuny, 2016) as well as the complexity (Kou & Hussain, 2007; Brochet et al., 2016), and 
credibility (Lu et al., 2011) of disclosures.  
The data have the advantage of being relatively time-efficient to collect and code and 
the data can be used to study large scale samples. Disclosure count can provide new valuable 
information to the capital market, for example the management might hold frequent 
conference calls to update outside providers of funds on relevant up-to-date information 




2.1.4 Properties of reported earnings  
This approach uses properties of reported earnings to measure financial reporting 
quality (e.g., Wang, 2006; Altamuro & Beatty, 2010; Chen et al., 2011; Kim & Venkatachalam, 
2011; Koh et al., 2013; Filip et al., 2015). For example, while Krishnan, Wen, and Zhao (2011) 
use accruals quality and discretionary accruals to measure financial reporting quality, 
Altamuro and Beatty (2010) use various characteristics of reported earnings such as changes 
in loan-loss provision, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, benchmark beating 
behavior, and accounting conservatism. Lang, Lins, and Maffett (2012) measure firm 
transparency by less evidence of earnings management using properties of reported earnings, 
among other measures such as better accounting standards, higher quality auditors, more 
analyst following, and more accurate analyst forecasts.  
Coding of these variables could be relatively easy and time-efficient and can be used 
for large-scale samples because these variables are constructed by means of economic 
modelling of available accounting figures rather than coding texts. Furthermore, both 
continuous and discrete proxies can be constructed. Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) review 
different measures of earnings quality such as the magnitude of accruals, residuals from 
accrual models and earnings persistence among others, and reach no single conclusion on 
what earnings quality is, because ‘‘quality’’ is dependent on the decision context. Thus, 
different properties of reported earnings may capture different dimensions of quality and 
may be valid in different contexts (Berger, 2011). Dechow et al. (2010) also suggest that 
properties of reported earnings capture underlying earnings process with errors that are 
related to fundamental firms’ characteristics, real economic performance and the 
measurement of performance, a problem that is common for almost all measures of 
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disclosure (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). Dechow et al. (2010) further suggest that different proxies 
based on reported earnings are not equally affected by these factors which emphasizes that 
these measures are not measuring the same underlying construct. In addition, corporate 
financial disclosure is not limited to the accounting figures disclosed in the financial 
statements. It also includes qualitative information in the form of text (e.g., Core, 2001; Easley 
& O’Hara, 2004; Beyer et al., 2010). Thus, using accounting quality to proxy for the overall 
quality of corporate financial disclosure would be limited. Leuz and Wysocki (2016) consider 
attributes of reported earnings as narrow measures of corporate disclosure and reporting 
which have the advantages of being able to facilitate consistent measurement across firms, 
but these measures raise concerns about other disclosure activities that could serve as a 
substitute or a complement, which need to be controlled for in the research design. For 
example, firms can compensate poor earnings quality with enhanced voluntary disclosure. 
Even though, whether earnings quality could serve as a substitute or a complement of 
disclosure quality is still an empirical issue since some scholars suggest that they   are 
substitutes (Mouselli, Jaafar, & Hussainey, 2012), while others suggest that they are 
complements (Francis et al., 2008). 
2.1.5 Sentiment analysis 
Scholars have used both quantitative and qualitative financial information to generate 
sentiments from corporate financial disclosure such as good/bad news disclosure and 
favorable/unfavorable disclosure. Some of the pioneer studies in this area include Clarkson, 
Kao, and Richardson (1994) and Skinner (1994). For example, Clarkson et al. (1994) measure 
voluntary disclosure of good (bad) news by positive (negative) changes in earnings in the 
current year compared to those of the previous year (or analysts’ forecasts of earnings). 
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Alternatively, a firm is classified as good news if the cumulative residuals from the market 
model for the firm over the eight-month period after the annual report date are larger than 
zero. Ali et al. (2007) use the change in earnings per share from that of the same quarter in 
the previous fiscal year, deflated by stock price at the beginning of the quarter as a measure 
for voluntary disclosure of bad news (negative changes) and vice versa. Bamber et al. (2010) 
measure good/bad news disclosure by the difference between the management forecast and 
the most recent I/B/E/S consensus analyst forecast, deflated by the closing price one day prior 
to the management forecast date. If the difference is non-negative (negative), this is coded 
as good (bad) news, and 0 otherwise. Desir (2012) measures good/bad news disclosure based 
on changes in dividends, where an increase in dividends is considered good news, while a 
decrease is considered bad news. 
 
In addition, both manual and automated textual analysis methods are used to 
measure the tone of a financial document (e.g. Skinner, 1994; Kothari et al., 2009; Li, 2010b; 
Rogers et al., 2011; Yekini et al., 2016). For example, Skinner (1994) constructs a measure of 
disclosure where disclosures are subjectively classified as good/bad/no news via manual 
textual analysis if the particular disclosure documents indicate that earnings will be 
better/worse/same compared to investor expectations. Rogers et al. (2011) use a dictionary-
based text analysis program to quantify optimistic tone on a continuous scale. Kravet and 
Muslu (2013) measure the negative tone in risk disclosures by changes in companies’ textual 
risk disclosures in the 10-K filings and provide evidence that textual risk disclosures reveal 
new information about corporate risks and uncertainties. Kearney and Liu (2014) survey 
different textual analysis methods applied on textual sentiment in the finance literature such 
as word lists, dictionary-based approach, and supervised machine learning. They suggest that 
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corporate disclosure literature often use the term ‘tone’ to refer to textual sentiment, but 
sentiment in a broader term is not limited to positivity–negativity, but also include other 
affects such as strong–weak, and active–passive. Loughran and McDonald (2016) find that 
much of the literature uses a bag-of-words approach, where the word sequence is ignored, 
and the characters of a document is parsed into chunks of words, to measure document 
sentiment. 
Sentiment analysis can be applied to both quantitative and qualitative financial 
information which indicates the flexibility of the method. Sentiments created from 
quantitative data, and textual sentiments developed using automated textual analysis are 
economical in terms of money, time and effort needed to implement the analysis, and can be 
applied to large samples. Both continuous and discrete proxies for disclosure can be 
constructed. However, the approach is inevitably subjective, hence the results could be hard 
to replicate and generalize, in particular with textual sentiments. In addition, while 
quantitative data can be distorted for several reasons such as earnings management, textual 
sentiments can be driven by different managerial incentives such as management reputation 
and impression management. In addition, textual sentiment analysis could be biased because 
of a managerial tendency to use positive words to frame negative statements (Loughran & 
McDonald, 2016). Perhaps future research should consider both quantitative and qualitative 
sentiments to control for this potential bias. Future research might also investigate how 
sentiments created using quantitative data compare with textual sentiments. 
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2.1.6 Textual analysis  
Textual analysis is a research method to draw inferences from texts to the context of 
their use. Loughran and McDonald (2016) suggest the following hierarchy9 of textual analysis: 
lexical, collocation, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and discourse. They claim that, to date, 
applications in accounting and finance are predominately in the initial phase of this 
interpretive sequence of lexical to discourse analysis.   
We discuss textual analysis to the extent relevant to the current study and refer the 
reader to several excellent review studies on the subject (e.g., Jones & Shoemaker, 1994; Li, 
2010a; Guo, Shi, & Tu, 2016; Loughran & McDonald, 2016; Grimmer & Stewart, 2013) for 
more in-depth discussion of the different methods employed under this approach. For 
example, Li (2010a) surveys recent empirical large-scale textual analysis studies by topical 
area (e.g., information content, earnings quality, market efficiency), and provides details on 
earlier manual-based textual analysis studies. Loughran and McDonald (2016) survey 
readability methods which attempts to measure the ability of the reader to decipher the 
intended message, and methods which typically focus on computationally extracting meaning 
from a collection of text such as bag-of-words methods and measuring document similarity. 
They address various methodological tripwires involved in these methods, highlight the 
challenges of separating out the concepts of business complexity and readability, and 
                                        
9 Loughran and McDonald (2016, pp.26-28) explain this hierarchy as following: the first step in analyzing text is 
lexical (bag-of-words) where the word sequence is ignored, and the characters of a document is parsed into chunks 
of words. Research interests at this stage are focused on some linguistic features such as word count, word 
difficulty and word frequency (Beattie, 2014). The second step, collection, is where meaning is derived from a 
collocation of words (or grams). For instance, the bigram of “going” and “concern” is an example where 
collocation is important, and if we extend this to n-grams, we can identify a collection of words as a sentence. 
Then using syntactic analysis, we can derive additional information by examining the grammatical structure of 
the sentence. Beyond syntax, semantics attempts to infer meaning within the context of the sentence. Pragmatics 
infers meaning from information immediately preceding and following the sentence, in addition to context 
provided by external knowledge. Finally, discourse is the attempt to derive meaning from the collective document. 
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emphasize the importance of replicability in the less-structured methods used in textual 
analysis. While, Guo et al. (2016) classify textual analysis methods into lexicon-based 
approach and machine learning approach, where the former includes readability measures 
and dictionary-based approach, and the later includes Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machines, 
Semantic Analysis and Neural Network. 
Textual analysis is commonly used to measure the quantity of disclosure (e.g., Chen, 
Cheng, Gong, & Tan, 2017a). However, the method is also used to assess other dimensions of 
disclosure such as quality (e.g., Chen, Miao, & Shevlin, 2015), complexity (e.g., You & Zhang, 
2009; Filzen & Peterson, 2015) and horizon (Brochet, Loumioti, & Serafeim, 2015). The 
disclosure being studied can be mandatory, voluntary, or both, which highlights the flexibility 
of the method. Textual analysis can be partial or comprehensive. Partial textual analysis 
covers part of a document or selected items of information or key words. Comprehensive 
textual analysis covers a whole document.  
Textual analysis can be conducted manually or automatically. One of the major 
limitations of manual textual analysis is that it is a labor-intensive data collection process, 
which inevitably tends to restrict the sample size employed (Beattie & Thomson, 2007). 
Therefore, in the 1980s, automated textual analysis emerged and has been commonly 
employed ever since (e.g., Frazier, Ingram, & Tennyson, 1984; Abrahamson & Amir, 1996; 
Smith & Taffler, 2000; Breton & Taffler, 2001; Schleicher, Hussainey, & Walker, 2007; You & 
Zhang, 2009; Brown & Tucker, 2011). Automated textual analysis is often accompanied by 
some element of manual textual analysis depending on the research method. Examples of 
studies that use automated textual analysis are Schleicher et al. (2007), You and Zhang (2009) 
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and Elshandidy, Fraser, and Hussainey (2015), and examples of manual textual analysis 
studies are Linsley and Shrives (2006), Boesso and Kumar (2007), and Chen et al. (2017a).  
Automated textual analysis is easy to use and economic in terms of the time, effort 
and financial resources needed to implement the method. It can be easily used to conduct a 
comprehensive textual analysis and to cover sizable samples. However, textual analysis is not 
problem–free. When implementing this approach either manually or automatically using the 
frequency of words or key words, all possible synonyms and words with multiple meanings 
should be included (Weber, 1990). Using inappropriate or insufficient key words could lead 
to over- or underestimation of a disclosure level. Additionally, using words or key words 
isolated from their context in the whole sentence does not provide a sound unit of analysis 
and may yield misleading results (Milne & Adler, 1999; Beattie & Thomson, 2007). 
Furthermore, coding (either manually or electronically) that is entirely based on a pre-defined 
word list without recourse to actual disclosure content may not be able to fully capture the 
construct under investigation, which limits the validity of the constructed measure of 
disclosure (Beattie & Thomson, 2007; Grüning, 2011; Loughran & McDonald, 2016). 
Moreover, the focus of this method is on reported qualitative information, which means that 
quantitative information well be ignored under this approach.  
Attempts to extend this approach beyond lexical analysis include, but are not limited 
to, the analysis of phrases rather than words and semantic analysis. For example, Grüning 
(2011) uses an information-retrieval vector space model (VSM), a supervised machine 
learning tool, to automatically analyze phrases (n-grams) rather than words; he argues that 
this provides better unit of analysis and eliminates human involvement in the process. Using 
VSM, Grüning (2011) undertakes the coding of corporate disclosure in two phases: training 
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and application. In the training phase, Grüning manually develops a comprehensive coding 
scheme based on a sample of representative annual reports, attempting to classify and 
quantify the diversity of corporate financial and non-financial disclosures. In the application 
phase, the coding scheme is automatically applied to a larger number of annual reports 
without human involvement to develop a disclosure score. Brown and Tucker (2011) provide 
another example of advancement in this area where they use VSM to measure changes in 
disclosure documents based on identifying semantic similarity. Changes in disclosure rather 
than disclosure levels could give us more meaningful insights about disclosure practice by 
removing boiler-plate disclosure for instance. However, the measure obtained is a summary 
of changes in a document and does not specify the nature of any changes in disclosure which 
have taken place (Berger, 2011).  
2.1.7 Attributes of management forecasts  
A management forecast is an item of forward-looking information, which 
management may provide in annual reports, interim reports, or elsewhere. This information 
may be quantitative (where a specific figure or range of figures is supplied) or qualitative 
(where a general direction or trend in company performance might be given). For example, 
management earnings forecasts available in the First Call database can take the following 
forms: point, range, one-sided directional, or confirming statements. They can be verified 
through actual earnings realizations, and hence they enable researchers to construct 
variables such as management forecast accuracy, error and bias. Recent studies also use 
management forecasts of cash flows, capital expenditures and store openings (e.g., Adhikari 




Management forecasts have been used widely in the accounting literature to assess 
voluntary disclosure quantity and quality, especially studies from the US10.  This may be 
because of the availability of these data in different databases such as that provided by First 
Call and the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service. Some studies only use attributes of 
management forecasts to assess the quality of voluntary disclosure (e.g., Yang, 2012; Bonsall 
et al., 2013; Cole & Jones, 2015; Kitagawa & Okuda, 2016; Zuo, 2016). While management 
earnings forecasts have the advantages of being concrete disclosure events, they are 
considered less comprehensive than other measures of disclosure such as AIMAR disclosure 
scores (Lang & Lundholm, 1996). In addition, management forecasts could be driven by 
different managerial incentives other than facilitating communication with external providers 
of funds such as management reputation and earnings management, which would affect the 
credibility of measures of disclosure developed from management forecasts (Kim & Park, 
2012; Beyer & Dye, 2012; Cheng, Luo, & Yue, 2013). However, attributes of management 
forecasts are relatively easy and time-efficient to construct and can be used for large-scale 
samples. Also, both continuous and discrete proxies for disclosure can be constructed using 
attributes of management forecasts (e.g., Baginski & Rakow, 2012; Bonsall et al., 2013).  
2.2 Non-disclosure-based approach  
The second measurement approach views disclosure as a latent (unobservable) 
variable, and thus measures it through some other (non-disclosure-based) observable 
variables such as market-based data and the adoption of high-quality accounting standards. 
                                        
10 While management earnings forecast disclosure is voluntary in the US market, it is mandatory for Japanese 
companies listed on a stock exchange (Suto & Takehara, 2018). 
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These observable variables are assumed to relate to the underlying concept (disclosure) that 
needs to be measured.  
Non-disclosure-based observable variables can be further classified into formative and 
reflective variables. The difference between formative and reflective variables is in the 
theorized direction of causality between the latent variable and the observable variables (e.g., 
Fayers & Hand, 2002; Jarvis et al., 2003). If the direction of causality is from the latent variable 
to the observable variables, and if changes in the latent variable are hypothesized to cause 
changes in the observable variables, then these measures are referred to as reflective 
variables. If the observable variables are hypothesized to cause changes in the latent variable, 
then they are referred to as formative variables. In the context of financial disclosure, possible 
examples of reflective variables are disclosure surveys and market-based measures of 
disclosure. This is because the direction of causality is hypothesized to be from corporate 
financial disclosure to these observable variables. Possible examples of formative variables 
are regulatory change, the adoption of high-quality accounting standards, and the use of 
American depositary receipts. This is because these observable variables are hypothesized to 
cause changes in corporate financial disclosure. Jarvis et al. (2003) provide decision rules for 
determining whether a measure is formative or reflective, although they note that answering 
the questions associated with these rules may be difficult and the answers may be 
contradictory. Although non-disclosure-based measures are less labor-intensive for 
researchers to develop because they do not require detailed analysis and coding of disclosure 
instruments and can be used for large-scale samples, their relationship with disclosure may 
be weak or bidirectional. In addition, using a reduced-form research design, that is not 
following the entire causal path between corporate disclosure and the variables of interest, 
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makes the analysis susceptible to omitted variable bias, e.g. the change in the variable of 
interest could be triggered by other omitted confounding variables such as institutional 
changes and economic shocks (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). Table 5 provides a summary of 
common non-disclosure-based measures identified in the current review of the literature.  
<<Insert Table 5 about here>> 
2.2.1 Formative measures 
(i)  Regulatory change that affects disclosure  
Many prior studies use a regulatory change event to proxy for a change in disclosure 
quantity or quality or both. For example, Zhou (2007) investigates the link between 
information asymmetry and increased accounting disclosures following the adoption of new 
auditing standards using a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the observation is 
from the post-adoption period, and zero otherwise. Wang (2010) uses a dummy variable 
equal to zero for the years 1998 through 2001 and one for the years 2002 through 2005 to 
proxy for increased internal control disclosures mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). 
Leuz et al. (2008) analyze the effects of SOX on SEC deregistration and examine the causes 
and consequences of a significant and voluntary decrease in a firm’s commitment to 
disclosure which they attribute largely to SOX. Bonaimé (2015) uses a categorical variable to 
proxy for increased transparency around the 2003 modification to SEC Rule 10b-18, which 
mandates enhanced disclosure of repurchase transactions. Other studies (e.g., Herrmann, 
Hope, & Thomas, 2008; Canace, Caylor, Johnson, & Lopez, 2010; Chen, Dhaliwal, & Xie, 2010) 
examine the consequences of Regulation Fair Disclosure, which prohibits the disclosure of 
material non-public information to selected groups or individuals such as financial analysts or 
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institutional investors. These studies use a dummy variable to proxy for the quantity and 
quality of disclosure. 
The method is easy to use and economical in terms of the time, effort and money 
consumed in constructing a proxy for a change in disclosure. Data to construct these variables 
either come from the event date or filings or databases containing information related to the 
event. However, the variables merely indicate that a change in disclosure either has/has not 
taken place, with no attempt to measure the size of this change. In addition, there is no 
attempt to assess the actual level of compliance with the regulatory change, which could be 
problematic; particularly in the absence of strong enforcement policies. Leuz and Wysocki 
(2016) suggest that the observed outcomes around a regulatory change are joint effects of 
that change and institutional complementarities such as the auditing supervisory agencies, 
and legal remedies. The impact of the institutional settings will also limit the ability to 
generalize the outcomes to other environments even if the causal relationship between a 
regulatory change and the variables of interest is correctly observed.  
(ii) Voluntary use of GAAP (e.g., US GAAP or IFRS) to indicate higher 
disclosure (GAAP) 
Several prior studies construct dummy variables about the voluntary adoption of 
GAAP which are used to proxy for higher disclosure (e.g., US GAAP or International Financial 
Reporting Standards [IFRS]) versus lower disclosure (local GAAP). For example, Van Tendeloo 
and Vanstraelen (2005) examine whether the adoption of IFRS is associated with lower levels 
of earnings management using a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm 
voluntarily adopts IFRS and zero otherwise; this dummy variable is used to proxy for enhanced 
financial reporting quality. Another example is Frino et al. (2013) who use the early adoption 
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of IFRS in Italy to proxy for increased disclosure and examine its effect on stock liquidity. A 
further example is Wan–Hussin (2009) who use the early adoption of an accounting standard 
associated with greater disclosure, namely the disaggregation of accounting information by 
business segments to proxy for corporate transparency. 
Data to construct the variable can be retrieved from databases, or researchers may 
need to inspect companies’ annual reports. These data have the advantage of being relatively 
time-efficient to collect and code and can be used for large-scale samples. However, the use 
of a dummy variable only splits companies into two mutually exclusive groups where actual 
disclosure can still differ among the members of the same group.  
2.2.2 Reflective measures  
(i) Market–based measures  
Market-based measures11 have been used to proxy for disclosure quantity or quality 
in prior studies (e.g., Ascioglu et al., 2005; Rogers, 2008; Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009; Reeb & 
Zhao, 2013). For example, Rogers (2008) uses changes in market liquidity to proxy for 
disclosure quality based on the argument that high-quality disclosure improves market 
liquidity. However, Berger (2011) notes that changes in market liquidity may arise for reasons 
other than changes in disclosure quality, that is the omitted variable problem. This problem 
can be eliminated by using control variables and validation tests, but the number of control 
variables needed might be sizeable. According to Berger (2011), Rogers’ (2008) attempt to 
include controls provides some validation for his measure of disclosure. 
                                        
11 We only provide some examples of market-based disclosure measures; thus, this should not be interpreted as a 
complete list of these measures.  
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Market-based measures of disclosure have the advantage of being easily obtainable from 
databases and can be estimated for large samples. Also, they can be constructed using both 
discrete and continuous variables. However, these measures usually suffer from a lack of 
theoretical casual path linking them with disclosure. In addition, failure to integrate market 
efficiency into the discussion could be a fatal oversight (Verrecchia, 2001). Moreover, the 
availability of these measures will be limited to listed companies only which indicates 
potential selection bias. Furthermore, market-based measures are noisy measures of 
corporate financial disclosure because they are likely to capture both public and private 
information, financial and non-financial information, and information provided by the 
company and by a third party such as financial analysts and the media. They are also likely to 
capture not only a firm’s disclosure practice but also its fundamental characteristics and 
performance. 
(ii) Disclosure survey  
A disclosure survey is an investigation of the perceptions of financial analysts, 
investors, or other user groups about firms’ disclosure practices through questionnaires or 
interviews (e.g., Nikolaev & Van Lent, 2005; Daske & Gebhardt, 2006; Brown & Hillegeist, 
2007; Glaum et al., 2013).  
Perhaps the most common example of a disclosure survey in the empirical accounting 
literature is that conducted by the Financial Analysts Federation and the Association for 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR), where results of these surveys have been 
used as proxies for disclosure quantity and quality in many prior US studies (e.g., Dhaliwal, 
Khurana, & Pereira, 2011; Huang & Zhang, 2012; Ali, Klasa, & Yeung, 2014).  Original scores 
about the importance of different disclosures can be also converted into a dummy variable 
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(e.g., Brown & Hillegeist, 2007). However, these scores are now out of date, given that they 
were discontinued in 1997 after the fiscal year 1995 (Core, 2001). Since then, several 
regulatory changes have taken place in the US that may have an impact on firms’ disclosure 
practices (Ertimur, 2007); the earlier survey evidence may therefore be redundant. 
 Other examples of studies using disclosure survey results in a European context are 
those of Daske and Gebhardt (2006) and Glaum et al. (2013).  Both studies use quality scores 
extracted from competitions for the best annual reports run by business journals to proxy for 
disclosure quality.  
Disclosure scores constructed by third-party organizations from surveys that they have 
conducted are not labor-intensive for a researcher because they are already completed. If the 
survey is applicable to a wide range of organisations, they can be employed for a sizable 
sample of firms compared to other research methods, such as the self-constructed disclosure 
index. Additionally, the scores obtained are usually constructed by using inputs from 
professional analysts familiar with the firms’ disclosures, and thus claimed to enable direct 
measurement of disclosure quality (Glaum et al., 2013). The scores are also claimed to capture 
both the quantity and quality of disclosure since they provide useful information to expert 
users of this information (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). However, this approach is based on analysts’ 
(or other user groups’) perceptions about firms’ disclosure rather than actual disclosure (Lang 
& Lundholm, 1993; Beattie et al., 2004). Moreover, the ratings are potentially biased towards 
large firms which tend to feature prominently in the surveys. Additionally, the objectivity of 
the views of the investigated user group may be doubted, given that no one will know the 
user group’s incentives to supply their ratings and the types of biases that may be present 
(Lang, 1999).  
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3. SOME EMIRICAL CHANLLENGES  
In this section we discuss some measurement issues related to the development of a 
measure of disclosure. These are causal claims and reliability and validity assessment. 
 
3.1 Causal claims 
 
A major empirical issue that most prior empirical studies on corporate financial 
disclosure face is the causal claim, whether implicit or explicit, made between corporate 
financial disclosure and other observable variables. Such a claim must first be grounded in 
theory, that is the causal link between corporate financial disclosure and the observable 
variables is established in theory, and properly examined using suitable econometric 
methods. Scholars often borrow theories from economics, finance and psychology to 
establish a theoretical causal link between corporate financial disclosure and other 
observable variables (e.g., Healy & Palepu, 2001; Knooe, Seybert, & Smith, 2011). Gow, 
Larcker and Reiss (2016) view that accounting research needs a clear discussion of the 
theoretical causal mechanism that is being assumed for the research question and suggest 
researchers to use causal diagrams to be very transparent about such claims. However, a lack 
of a relevant theory that links corporate financial disclosure with other observable variables 
could be an issue. For example, Core (2001, p.449) suggests that tests of a link between 
disclosure quality and the cost of capital are joint tests of a theory linking disclosure quality 
to information asymmetry and a theory linking information asymmetry to a cost of capital. 
Even when a strong theoretical link between corporate financial disclosure and other 
observable variables can be established, a causal claim may still not be attainable if the 
variables are endogenous. Endogeneity occurs when the explanatory variable correlates with 
the error term of the estimation model. This will result in inconsistent and biased estimation 
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of the coefficient of the explanatory variable, that is it does not converge to its true population 
value no matter how large the sample size is. This, in turn, means that the effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable cannot be interpreted. Some scholars shy 
away from inferring a causal link between disclosure and other observable variables, claiming 
that they are testing for association rather than causation. However, if endogeneity exists, 
even a simple correlation between the dependent variable and independent variable cannot 
be inferred because the magnitude of the effect can be wrong as well as its sign (Antonakis, 
Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). Endogeneity occurs for a variety of reasons such as 
omitting important control variables from the estimation model, omitting fixed effects, 
omitting confounding variables, reverse causality, measurement errors in the independent 
variables, and model misspecification, among others (Ibid). For example, most disclosure 
studies either examine the determinants or consequences of disclosure but not both, which 
might fail to account for the full causal chain between disclosure and the variables of interest. 
This is called a reduced-form research design, which makes the analysis susceptible to 
endogeneity bias. 
Examples12 of prior studies which explicitly control for endogeneity bias in corporate 
financial disclosure literature are Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005), Lapointe–Antunes et al. 
(2006), Altamuro and Beatty (2010), Lim, Matolcsy, and Chow (2007), and Hope and Thomas 
(2008). For example, Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005) investigate two sources of endogeneity 
bias that affect the estimation of the relation between cost-of-debt capital and disclosure, 
namely: unobservable firm heterogeneity and observable omitted variables. They attempt to 
                                        
12 We were not specifically looking for discussions of endogeneity issue in prior studies when we did our survey, 




mitigate this endogeneity bias by relying on theory to identify additional variables correlated 
with both disclosure and cost-of-debt capital and by applying fixed effects estimation. 
Another source of endogeneity bias is reverse causality, which means that the relationship 
between corporate financial disclosure and other observable variables could be bi-directional. 
For example, Brown and Hillegeist (2007) control for the endogeneity bias caused by a reverse 
causality between disclosure quality and information asymmetry by employing a 
simultaneous equations approach.  
Antonakis et al. (2010) provide an excellent review of the different sources of 
endogeneity bias and present methods that allow social scientists to test causal claims in non-
experimental settings where randomization is not possible, such as simultaneous-equation 
models, Heckman selection models, regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference 
models, among others. Attempts to discuss sources of endogeneity bias in the accounting 
literature include Larcker and Rusticus (2010), Tucker (2010), Peel (2014; 2016), Gow et al. 
(2016), and Leuz and Wysocki (2016).  For example, Larcker and Rusticus (2010) provide some 
insights into the use of instrumental variables and simultaneous equations by accounting 
researchers to mitigate the biases caused by endogeneity of the predictor variables. Table 1 
in their study shows that disclosure research makes use of instrumental variables and 
identifies other accounting research areas such as auditing and earnings management. Gow 
et al. (2016) evaluate the different approaches accounting researchers adopt to draw causal 
inferences from observational data based on a review of all papers published in three leading 
accounting journals in 2014. They find that about 90% of these papers seek to draw causal 
inferences and that the most common estimation methods used in these studies include 
ordinary least-squares regression, difference-in-differences estimates, and propensity-score 
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matching. However, they claim that the assumptions required for these methods to deliver 
credible estimates of causal effects are unlikely to be met in many applications that rely on 
observational data. They suggest that accounting research would benefit from more in-depth 
descriptive research, including a greater focus on the study of causal mechanisms and 
increased emphasis on the structural modeling of the phenomena of interest. Leuz and 
Wysocki (2016) discuss how all measures of corporate disclosure and reporting share a 
fundamental problem which is the need to separate a firm’s reporting from its underlying 
economic characteristics and performance. However, corporate economic characteristics, 
disclosure policy and performance are co-determined by management strategy, that is 
management strategy identifies what a firm does and how it performs, and that the omission 
of this variable from the study methodologies causes an endogeneity problem. Leuz and 
Wysocki (2016) suggest structural equations modelling, among others, to address this 
problem. Tucker (2010) and Peel (2014; 2016) discuss selection bias in accounting research 
that is due to both observable and unobservable differences between the selected control 
firms and the sample firms in evaluating treatment effects and suggest methods to control 
both types of bias.  
 
3.2 Reliability and validity assessment 
In our search for measures of corporate financial disclosure, we observe that most 
studies tend to use a single measure of disclosure. Some studies use more than one measure 
for disclosure to examine different aspects of corporate disclosure or to check the robustness 
of their results. For example, Francis et al. (2008) use a disclosure index, as well as four 
categories of disclosure within the index, and finally, three alternative measures of voluntary 
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disclosure: management forecast behaviour, number of firm-initiated press releases, and 
conference call activity. 
However, whether a study uses one or more measures for corporate disclosure, and 
whatever the approach or scale used to develop it, it is constructed to approximate a 
theoretical concept that is difficult to measure directly. Hence, it is necessary to assess 
whether the measure of disclosure employed is a reliable and valid one. If the measure is not 
reliable and invalid, the resultant statistical inferences will not be meaningful. Although 
assessment of measures of disclosure is discussed to some extent in the accounting literature, 
a comprehensive analysis is lacking. Therefore, this section discusses the extent to which 
testing for reliability and validity is carried out within papers identified in our systematic 
literature review. Table 6 shows a list of the papers that have conducted some sorts of 
reliability and validity testing. 
<<Insert Table 6 about here>> 
3.2.1 Reliability Assessment 
Reliability concerns the ability of a measurement instrument (e.g., a disclosure index) 
to produce consistent results in repeated trials. It also concerns the internal consistency of a 
measurement instrument, that is, the extent to which all parts of a measurement instrument 
are measuring the same thing (Carmines & Zeller, 1991). Reliability has three common forms: 
test-retest, inter-coder reliability, and internal consistency.  
The test-retest measures the stability of the results obtained from a measurement 
instrument over time. In terms of textual analysis, for example, stability can be determined 
when the same text is coded more than once by the same coder (Weber, 1990, p. 17). Al-Akra 
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and Ali’s (2012) study is one example of how the test-retest approach can be used in manual 
coding for a self-constructed disclosure index. They rely on one coder in the coding process, 
and to reduce coding error, the annual reports were screened twice with the voluntary 
disclosure checklists.  
Reproducibility or inter-coder reliability refers to the extent to which content 
classification produces the same results when the same text is coded by more than one coder 
(Weber, 1990, p. 17). Inter-coder reliability can be measured by the coefficient of agreement 
(e.g., Al-Shammari et al., 2008), which is the ratio of the number of pairwise inter-judge 
agreements to the total number of pairwise judgements (Beattie et al., 2004, p. 214). The 
higher the coefficient obtained, the higher the reliability of the measurement instrument. 
Because this measure does not consider the likelihood of random agreement between the 
coders, it is not perceived as an adequate measure of inter-rater reliability unless 
discrepancies between the coders are scarce or the discrepancies have been analyzed and 
any differences have been resolved (e.g., Rogers & Grant, 1997; Milne & Adler, 1999). To 
overcome the problem of random agreement between the coders, other measures including 
Scott’s pi (e.g., Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Abraham & Cox, 2007), Krippendorff’s alpha (e.g., 
Boesso & Kumar, 2007), Cohen’s kappa (e.g., Hooghiemstra, 2010), and Leigh’s lambda are 
used to test for inter-coder reliability (for more details, see Milne & Adler, 1999).  
The third form of reliability is internal consistency. Litwin (1995, p. 21) describes 
internal consistency as ‘an indicator of how well the different items measure the same issue. 
This is important because a group of items that purports to measure one variable should 
indeed be clearly focused on that variable’. For example, Hassan et al. (2009), Cormier et al. 
(2010), and Elshandidy and Shrives (2016) use Cronbach’s alpha, which is a measure of inter-
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item correlation, to assess the internal consistency of their measures of disclosure. Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) compute pairwise parametric and non-parametric correlations between all 
the components of their disclosure index to assess internal consistency. Similarly, Kelton and 
Yang (2008) assess the correlation between the categories of their internet financial reporting 
index. 
The low level of reliability testing identified within our review is consistent with 
research by Beattie and Thomson (2007), who report that reliability issues do not appear to 
be addressed in most intellectual capital disclosure studies which they examined. Reliability 
tests are mainly performed in studies that use a disclosure index and manual textual analysis. 
These types of disclosure measures are susceptible to coder error and judgement. However, 
many studies with no apparent reliability testing use a disclosure index or other variables 
obtained from company disclosures. Other measures of disclosure are based on third-party 
data with less room for coder error and judgement, such as market-based measures of 
disclosure. We recommend that researchers should consider the importance of conducting 
reliability tests of disclosure measures in future studies, when measures of disclosure are 
subject to coder error and judgement. 
3.2.2 Validity Assessment 
Validity is defined as ‘the extent to which any measuring instrument measures what it 
is intended to measure’ (Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 17). There are three common types of 
validity scrutinised in disclosure studies: content, criterion, and construct. 
The first type of validity is content validity. This is assessed by seeking subjective 
opinions or judgements from non-experts and/or professionals (hence some refer to it as face 
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validity) about how well the instrument measures what it is intended to measure. In our 
systematic review, we find that most cases of content validity testing are conducted in 
disclosure index and textual analysis studies. Not surprisingly, these studies use measures of 
disclosure that are subject to judgement; hence the authors seek reassurance about the face 
validity of their measurements of disclosure. A typical example is Patelli and Prencipe (2007), 
who explain that the inclusion of an item in their disclosure checklist is based on a prior study 
and is subject to amendment to suit the country in the investigation. They then consult with 
three experienced auditors and three financial analysts to test its suitability for the Italian 
setting that they are examining. However, this type of validity is never seen as sufficient when 
concluding about the validity of a measure. This may be because of concerns about users’ 
perceptions regarding their own use of the information (Dhaliwal, 1980). 
Criterion validity is a measure of how well one instrument compares with another 
instrument or “predictor” (Litwin, 1995, p. 37). Criterion validity assesses if there is a 
significant correlation between a measure and an external criterion (a desirable outcome). 
The higher the magnitude of the correlation coefficient, the more valid this instrument or 
measure is for this criterion. There are two types of criterion validity: concurrent and 
predictive. The difference between them is the time horizon considered: concurrent validity 
concerns the correlation between a measure and the criterion at the same time, whereas 
predictive validity concerns the correlation between a future criterion and the relevant 
measure.  For example, Boesso and Kumar (2007) test the criterion validity of their measure 
of voluntary disclosure by correlating the number of observations on social perspectives 
obtained through their textual analysis with the number of awards received by the company. 
They argue that the greater the emphasis of a company on social activities, the greater the 
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likelihood of being recognized in the form of awards for stakeholder communication by 
independent evaluators. Grüning (2011) and Ernstberger and Grüning (2013) provide another 
example where their measures of disclosure correlate negatively with measures of 
information asymmetry, that is the desired outcomes of enhanced disclosure is to reduce 
information asymmetry. However, criterion validity is less likely to be used when assessing 
the validity of social science measures. This is because most social science measures represent 
theoretical concepts for which there are no known criterion variables available for 
comparison. The more abstract the concept, the less likely one is to discover an appropriate 
criterion for assessing a measure of it (Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p.20). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that in our systematic review we find relatively few examples of this test among 
the studies considered. 
In contrast to both content validity and criterion validity, construct validity has 
generalized applicability in the social sciences. ‘It is concerned with the extent to which a 
particular measure relates to other external measures consistent with theoretically derived 
hypotheses concerning the concepts (or constructs) that are being measured’ (Carmines & 
Zeller, 1979, p. 23). Therefore, testing for the construct validity of a measure of disclosure 
involves three steps: (i) to specify the links between the measure of disclosure and some 
theoretically related external variables, (ii) to test this theoretical links empirically, and (iii) to 
explain how the empirical evidence clarifies the construct validity of the measure of 
disclosure, which requires a pattern of consistent findings with prior studies. For example, 
Blanco et al. (2014) examine the association between their measure of the quantity of 
segment disclosure and common control variables, such as firm size, firm age, profitability, 
and leverage, and obtain results that are largely consistent with prior studies, to provide 
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evidence on the construct validity of their measure of disclosure.  Additionally, according to 
Weber (1990, p. 19), ‘a measure has construct validity to the extent that it is correlated with 
some other measures of the same construct13’, provided that these measures are proven to 
be reliable and valid measures of that construct. For example, Ernstberger and Grüning (2013) 
show that their measure of disclosure has construct validity with respect to other disclosure 
rankings; its association with the AIMR rating, Standard & Poor’s transparency disclosure 
score and other rating methods is significant.  
Although in our systematic review we find some evidence of validity testing, future 
researchers should carry out validity tests as a matter of course, otherwise the link between 
their proposed measures and corporate financial disclosure might be wrong or misleading. 
Overall, Table 6 shows that both the disclosure index and textual analysis methods are heavily 
scrutinised for their reliability and validity as measures for financial disclosure, which justifies 
more reliance being placed on these measures of disclosure in future studies. 
4. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The framework for disclosure measurement developed in this study identifies two 
approaches: (i) a disclosure-based approach that focuses on investigating actual disclosure, 
operationalizes the concept of disclosure by disaggregating it into its main dimensions such 
as the quantity and quality of disclosure, and develops methods to measure them, such as 
the disclosure index and textual analysis, and (ii) a non-disclosure-based approach that deals 
with disclosure as a latent (unobservable) variable that we indirectly observe through the 
values of another observable variable(s). These non-disclosure observable variables can be 
                                        
13 In our view, this definition of construct validity could be seen as a narrower application of the former, as Weber 
limits the potential external variables to other measures of the same construct only. 
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further classified into formative variables and reflective variables, depending on whether the 
measure is a determinant or a consequence of disclosure. Our systematic review shows that 
most prior studies tend to use disclosure-based measures rather than non-disclosure-based 
measures when investigating disclosure. This is because disclosure-based measures have 
concrete links to actual disclosure and their reliability and validity can be extensively assessed 
– as in prior studies. Additionally, most measures of disclosure uncovered in our review are 
discrete. Discrete measures can be bivariate (0/1 dummies) or multivariate (e.g., disclosure 
index). Some non-disclosure-based measures are continuous (e.g., market liquidity). 
However, most disclosure proxies merely rank companies relative to each other, that is, there 
is no true zero point. Thus, these measures do not possess the characteristics of a ratio scale, 
but at best only possess the characteristics of an interval scale. Other measures are merely 
ordinal. Whether a measure is discrete or continuous is important because it impacts the type 
of econometric analysis that can be employed on the data. 
We find that traditional methods for measuring disclosure through direct investigation 
of a disclosure vehicle such as the disclosure index method continue to dominate the 
literature, with the classification approach being particularly popular. This prevalence seems 
to be motivated by ease of coding and the ability to consider large samples. However, the 
classification approach only sorts companies into mutually exclusive groups with no attempt 
to study variations in the disclosure attribute within each group. To the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, no new methods are observed that investigate a disclosure vehicle directly, but 
new directions in the application of automated textual analysis are observed. For example, 
Grüning (2011) uses VSM, a supervised machine learning tool, to analyze phrases rather than 
words and to replicate human coding, while Brown and Tucker (2011) use VSM to measure 
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document similarity. Further developments in the artificial intelligence area are expected to 
induce improvement in automated textual analysis by providing different units for 
investigation and new directions of analysis. For example, the application of the concept of 
deep learning in natural language processing could enhance machine coding of textual 
sentiment analysis and eliminate human involvement (e.g., Araque, Corcuera-Platas, 
Sánchez-Rada, & Iglesias, 2017; Chen, Xu, He, & Wang, 2017b). However, automated textual 
analysis methods will never replace careful and close reading of texts given the complexity of 
language and research interests in both the intended and unintended information conveyed 
by the text (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013; Loughran & McDonald, 2016). Another common 
feature of traditional methods is that they focus on individual items of information, key words 
or phrases rather than the inter-relationship between them. New visualization methods in 
qualitative data analysis software, such as tag clouds, tree maps, cluster analysis, and word 
trees, will help researchers to see the patterns and connections in their data and gain more 
insight about the disclosures. 
The non-disclosure-based measurement approach considers a range of observable 
variables that are related to financial disclosure, such as market-based measures. The non-
disclosure-based measures are used to reflect on the different dimensions of financial 
disclosure such as its quality and quantity. The measures are relatively less labor-intensive for 
researchers because these they do not require detailed analysis and coding of the disclosure 
instruments. Data are mostly retrieved and coded from databases, thus enabling the usage of 
large-scale samples. This may be a pragmatic response to the preference given to large 
samples by US–based journals. However, the link between these observable variables and 
financial disclosure may be weak or bidirectional, thus they should be treated with caution. 
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In addition, an estimation model that involves these variables is likely to suffer from 
endogeneity bias for different reasons such as reduced-form research design. 
We also discuss some empirical challenges related to causal claims and the reliability 
and validity assessment of measures of disclosure.   To make a causal claim between a 
measure of disclosure and other observable variables, a full theoretical causal path must be 
grounded in theory and properly examined using suitable econometric methods. However, 
the theoretical link between disclosure and other observable variables might be weak or 
bidirectional and the research model might be susceptible to endogeneity bias. If endogeneity 
exists, scholars must deal with it, otherwise their results cannot be interpreted. Antonakis et 
al. (2010) provide an excellent review of the different sources of the endogeneity problem 
and present methods that allow social scientists to test causal claims in non-experimental 
settings where randomization is not possible. In addition, the Granger causality test might 
statistically help to detect the direction of causation (Gujarati, 2010) for temporal data, but 
the results of this test are sensitive to the number of lags included. While there are some 
attempts to discuss sources of endogeneity bias in accounting research in general (e.g., 
Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Tucker, 2010; Peel, 2016; Gow et al., 2016; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016) 
to date, a comprehensive review of causal claims in corporate financial disclosure literature 
is lacking. Due to the gravity of this issue and how false inferences from empirical studies 
could impact business practice and policy formulation at firm level and national and 
international levels, future research might consider reviewing causal claims in prior empirical 
financial disclosure studies and their methodological rigor.  
Finally, we document a low level of reliability and validity testing within papers 
identified in our systematic literature review. Reliability and validity tests are mainly 
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performed in studies employing either textual analysis or the disclosure index method to 
measure disclosure. Furthermore, these two methods have the advantages of being 
disclosure-based and flexible measures of disclosure; hence they could be considered 
superior to other measures of disclosure. However, ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’ are typically 
perceived as inversely related (Deffner, 1986). For instance, while human coding shows 
greater validity because coding can be linked to the underlying construct, it is subject to 
judgement and coding errors which could reduce its reliability. Therefore, while validity 
assessment will continue to be essential for all measures of financial disclosure in future 
research because they are developed to measure a construct that cannot be measured 
directly, reliability assessment will only be an issue for the measures that are subject to 
coders’ judgment and errors. In addition, researchers should be cautious because validity is 
context-specific, that is what could be a valid measure for corporate financial disclosure in 
one context might be invalid in a different context. 
A current phenomenon of research into corporate financial disclosure is that it often 
fails to state explicitly the dimension of disclosure it is investigating (e.g., quantity, quality, 
tone, prominence, etc.). This is problematic because different measures of disclosure may 
only be appropriate for investigating specific dimensions of disclosure. For example, while 
textual analysis could be a suitable method to measure the extent of disclosure, a 
classification method would be more suitable to examine the prominence given to certain 
disclosures. Additionally, different inferences can be drawn about different dimensions of the 
same type of disclosure. For example, some prior studies use disclosure quantity (e.g., Cheung 
et al., 2010; Mouselli et al., 2012) as a proxy for disclosure quality, although the quantity and 
the quality measures may lead to different rankings for one sample of companies. In addition, 
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the concept of disclosure quality is subjective and what constitutes quality is still a research 
question (e.g., Core, 2001; Botosan, 2004; Beattie et al., 2004). Also, more disclosure 
(quantity) can come at the cost of quality if it hinders readability and increases complexity. 
Therefore, future researchers should be explicit about the exact dimension(s) of financial 
disclosure they are investigating and whether the measure of disclosure being employed is, 
in fact, measuring what it seeks to measure. Additionally, some methods or measures of 
disclosure are limited in their scope (either numbers or texts) such as textual analysis which 
focuses on analyzing texts, whereas properties of reported earnings approach focus on 
accounting numbers only. Therefore, inferences obtained from such metrics should be 
qualified to reflect their limitations. Furthermore, prior studies have tried to develop proxies 
for the different dimensions of financial disclosure such as transparency, complexity, 
quantity, quality, tone, etc. However, a comprehensive list of the necessary and sufficient 
dimensions of disclosure is lacking, which future research might seek to develop.  
Whether a measure of disclosure can be used to assess voluntary or mandatory 
disclosure is another issue that a researcher needs to consider. Most disclosure-based 
measures have the flexibility to be applied to different types of disclosure. However, while 
manual coding can possibly account for different types of disclosure being studied, machine 
coding is less able to distinguish between the two types of disclosure based on a search of 
some key words or targeted phrases. This problem can be mitigated if the document is only 
covering one type of disclosure. On the other hand, some measures are linked to a specific 
type of disclosure such as the properties of reported earnings, which relate to financial 
reporting regulations. Others, such as a disclosure survey (Beyer et al., 2010), can capture 
both voluntary and mandatory disclosures. Therefore, future researchers should be clear 
45 
 
about their choice of disclosure measure and consider whether it is solely identifying the 
specific type of disclosure they aim to measure.   
Another related issue to consider is the time orientation of information disclosure, 
that is whether it is historical information, concurrent information or forward-looking 
information. Some measures of disclosure can be used to reflect on these different aspects 
of disclosure such as the disclosure index and textual analysis methods. Other measures of 
disclosure can only reflect on a specific type of information. For example, attributes of 
management forecasts are measures for forward-looking information, while properties of 
reported earnings are reflecting on historical information. Thus, understanding the time 
orientation of information disclosure is important to define a suitable measure for disclosure. 
Additionally, the content of disclosure could vary, which might cause different proxies of the 
same attribute of the same type of disclosure to behave differently in empirical analysis. For 
example, Francis et al. (2008) find that various measures of the level of voluntary disclosure 
(self-constructed disclosure index, management forecast behavior, press releases, 
conference calls) do not produce consistent results in their relations with earnings quality and 
cost of capital. They suggest that these different measures of the extent of voluntary 
disclosure are likely to capture different forms of voluntary disclosure (forward-looking 
information supplied by management; contemporaneous discussion of results in conference 
calls; an overall index of voluntary disclosure in mandatory filings) that have different content 
and are likely to be motivated by different managerial incentives.  
Given the several aspects of financial disclosure that are at play, and the considerable 
number of measures of financial disclosure identified in our paper, there is a scope for further 
research into how the different measures, all other things being equal, compare with one 
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another. It would be interesting to obtain or calculate as many proxies of disclosure as 
possible for a carefully selected sample of companies. Analysis could then be carried out to 
see how the different proxies compare in one period and over time. Future research might 
also investigate the interactions between the different dimensions, the different time 
orientation and the different types of disclosure, their determinants and consequences, and 
how they compare. For example, how does the quality of concurrent voluntary disclosure 
compare to the quality of forward-looking voluntary disclosure? And which one is better able 
to explain changes in firm value for example, and why? How does the tone or complexity of 
concurrent voluntary disclosure compare to that of concurrent mandatory disclosure? Which 
type of information disclosure tends to be more complex and why? 
To conclude, the concept of corporate financial disclosure is inherently 
complex.  Corporate financial disclosure has different types (mandatory and voluntary), 
different vehicles (e.g., company reports, conference calls and press release), different time 
orientations (e.g., historical data, concurrent data, forward–looking data), different 
dimensions (e.g., quality, quantity, tone, and prominence), and different formats (e.g., 
numbers and texts). The different aspects of corporate financial disclosure are probably 
impossible to unequivocally and conclusively determine. Consequently, all measurement, to 
some extent, is inevitably subjective and partial. This paper identifies 11 common measures 
of disclosure that a researcher can choose from depending on the purpose of study, data 
availability and economic factors in terms of time, effort and money needed to develop a 
measure of disclosure. However, more work is needed to develop innovative and diverse 
research methods that can capture the richness of the concept of financial disclosure. New 
methods need not be sophisticated if simple methods can address the research question(s). 
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Scholars introducing new methods to the literature should explain them in detail to make 
their results replicable.  
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Table 1. Measures for disclosure identified in previous review articles 
 Marston and 
Shrives (1991) 
Jones and Shoemaker 
(1994) 
Healy and Palepu 
(2001) 
Beattie et al. 
(2004) 





Thematic analysis of 
narratives in annual 
reports, etc. 














Characters, words, lines, 
sentences, paragraphs, 






























AIMR scores AIMR scores 





Specific disclosures such as 
management forecasts, 
conference calls and segment 
disclosures 
    Properties of 
reported earnings 
Properties of reported earnings 




Table 2. Information about the sample of studies used in the systematic review 
This table shows a break-down of the 280 papers covered in this review by journal. 
 
Journal Number of papers % 
The Accounting Review 45 16.07 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 40 14.29 
Journal of Accounting Research 31 11.07 
The International Journal of Accounting 26 9.29 
Review of Accounting Studies 22 7.86 
Contemporary Accounting Research 19 6.79 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 19 6.79 
European Accounting Review 17 6.07 
Accounting Horizons 16 5.71 
The British Accounting Review 15 5.36 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 9 3.21 
Abacus 7 2.50 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 6 2.14 
Accounting and Business Research 3 1.07 
Accounting, Organizations and Society  2 0.71 
Accounting Forum 1 0.36 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 1 0.36 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting 1 0.36 
Total 280 100 
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Table 3. Common proxies for financial disclosure  
This table shows the extent of commonly used measurements for disclosure in prior studies and provides some 
exemplars.  
 
Measurement Approach Count % Exemplars  
Classification 
approach 
DB 112 30.19 Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto (2005); Marquardt 
and Wiedman (2007); Hollander, Pronk, and 
Roelofsen (2010); Gillan and Panasian (2014); 
Cannizzaro and Weiner (2015). 
Disclosure index DB 50 13.48 Dargenidou, Mcleay, and Raonic (2006); Guedhami 
and Pittman (2006); Hodgdon, Tondkar, Adhikari, 
and Harless (2009); Han, Kang, and Yoo (2012); 
Melis, Gaia, and Carta (2015); Mangena, Li, and 
Tauringana (2016). 
Disclosure count DB 36 9.70 Debreceny and Rahman (2005); Bergman and 
Roychowdhury (2008); Lu, Richardson, and Salterio 
(2011); Fu, Kraft, and Zhang (2012); Kirk and 
Vincent (2014); Brochet, Naranjo, and Yu (2016). 
Properties of 
reported earnings 
DB 34 9.16 Wang (2006); Altamuro and Beatty (2010); Chen, 
Hope, Li, and Wang (2011); Kim and 
Venkatachalam (2011); Koh, Rajgopal, and 
Srinivasan (2013); Filip, Labelle, and Rousseau 
(2015). 
Sentiment analysis DB 34 9.16 Kothari, Li, and Short (2009); Li (2010b); Bamber, 
Hui, and Yeung (2010); Rogers, Van Buskirk, and 
Zechman (2011); Kravet and Muslu (2013); Yekini, 
Wisniewski, and Millo (2016). 
Textual analysis DB 31 8.36 Boesso and Kumar (2007); Abraham and Cox 
(2007); Grüning (2011); Brown and Tucker (2011); 




DB 29 7.82 Yang (2012); Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fischer (2013); 





NDB 21 5.66 Zhou (2007); Leuz, Triantis, and Wang (2008); 
Wang (2010); Arping and Sautner (2013); Bonaimé 
(2015); Cho (2015). 
Market-based 
measures 
NDB 10 2.70 Ascioglu, Hegde, and McDermott (2005); Rogers 
(2008); Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009); Reeb and 
Zhao (2013). 
Disclosure surveys NDB 7 1.89 Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005); Daske and Gebhardt 
(2006); Brown and Hillegeist (2007); Huang and 
Zhang (2012); Glaum, Baetge, Grothe, and Rster 
(2013). 
Use of GAAP (e.g., 
US GAAP or IFRS) 
to indicate higher 
disclosure 
NDB 7 1.89 Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005); Lapointe–
Antunes, Cormier, Magnan, and Gay-Angers (2006); 
Wan-Hussin (2009); Frino, Palumbo, Capalbo, 
Gerace, and Mollica (2013).  
Total number of 
common proxies of 
disclosure 
 371* 100   
*. Some studies use more than one measure of disclosure, therefore the total number of measures of disclosure employed in 
prior studies exceeds the number of studies covered in our systematic review, that is 280 studies. DB (NDB): disclosure-based 
(non-disclosure-based) measurement approach.  
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Table 4. Summary of common disclosure-based measures of financial disclosure  
This tables provides a summary of common disclosure-based measures of corporate financial disclosure covered 
in this review. It shows how each measure reflects on a specific dimension(s) of disclosure and the common pros 
and cons. It also shows whether the measure of disclosure is discrete or continuous which can impact the type of 
econometric analysis that can be employed. 
 




Main Strengths and weaknesses  
Classification 
approach 




Discrete Pros. The approach is flexible and can be applied to different types 
and dimensions of disclosure. It can capture one type of disclosure 
at a time. It is easy and economical to use in terms of the time, 
effort and money consumed, and can be applied to large samples. 
Cons. It merely classifies the data to mutually exclusive categories 
without any attempt to capture differences in the dimension of 
disclosure among the members of the same group. Coding could be 
subjective, and hence results could be difficult to replicate, 
compare and generalize. 
Disclosure index It is typically 
used to measure 
the quantity 
and/or quality of 
disclosure 
Discrete Pros. The measure fits the project well. The method is flexible and 
can be applied to different types of disclosure. It can also capture 
one type of disclosure at a time. 
Cons. Self-constructed disclosure index is a subjective method for 
measuring disclosure, hence the results are hard to replicate and 
generalize. It is also a labor-intensive and time-consuming method 
which results in utilizing small samples. 
Disclosure 
Count 
It is commonly 
used to measure 
disclosure 
quantity 
Discrete Pros. The approach is flexible and can be applied to different types 
of disclosure. It is easy and economical to use in terms of the time, 
effort and money consumed, and can be applied to large samples. 
Cons. It merely counts the number of disclosures being made without 
any attempt to investigate their content or context. It could also be 
driven by different managerial incentives other than facilitating 




They are usually 
used to measure 





Pros. Both continuous and discrete proxies for disclosure can be 
constructed. Coding is relatively easy and time-efficient and can be 
used for large-scale samples. Measures can facilitate consistent 
measurement across firms. 
Cons. The quality of financial reporting is not limited to accounting 
quality only. Different properties of reported earnings may capture 
different dimensions of quality (Berger, 2011). Other disclosure 
activities that could serve as a substitute or a complement. 
Sentiment 
analysis 
It is usually used 
to measure the 




 Pros. The approach is flexible and can be applied to both 
quantitative and qualitative financial information. It is easy and 
economical to use with quantitative data and can be applied to large 
samples. Both continuous and discrete measures for disclosure can 
be constructed. 
Cons. The approach is inevitably subjective.  While quantitative 
data can be distorted, textual sentiments can be driven by different 
managerial incentives such as management reputation. 
Textual analysis It is frequently 
used to measure 
the quantity and 
quality of 
disclosure 
Discrete Pros. The approach is flexible and can be applied to different types 
of disclosure. Automated textual analysis is particularly easy and 
economical to use in terms of the time, effort and money 
consumed, and can be applied to large samples.  
Cons. The use of key words does not provide a sound unit of 
analysis. Using inappropriate or insufficient key words could lead 
to over- or underestimation of disclosure level. In addition, coding 
based on a pre-defined list of words that is developed in isolation of 
actual disclosure texts may not be able to fully capture the construct 
under investigation, which limits the validity of the constructed 
















Pros. Both continuous and discrete measures for disclosure can be 
constructed. Coding is relatively easy and time-efficient and can be 
used for large-scale samples. 
Cons. Management forecasts are relatively less comprehensive 
measures of disclosure and they could be subject to earnings 
management, which would affect the quality of these forecasts as 
measures of disclosure. 
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Table 5. Summary of common non-disclosure-based measures of financial disclosure  
This tables provides a summary of common non-disclosure-based measures of corporate financial disclosure 
covered in this review. It shows how each measure reflects on a specific dimension(s) of disclosure and the 
common pros and cons. It also shows whether the measure of disclosure is discrete or continuous which can 
impact the type of econometric analysis that can be employed.  
 




Main Strengths and weaknesses*  
Formative measures 
Regulatory 
change that affects 
disclosure 
It is often used to proxy 
for a change in the 
quantity or quality of 
disclosure 
Discrete  Pros. The approach is easy to use and 
economical in terms of time, effort and 
money consumed in constructing a proxy for 
disclosure. 
Cons. The variable merely indicates a change 
in disclosure, with no attempt to measure the 
size of that change. There is no attempt to 
assess actual level of compliance with the 
regulatory change, which could be 
problematic, particularly in the absence of 
strong enforcement policies. 
Voluntary use of 
GAAP (e.g., US 
GAAP or IFRS) 
to indicate higher 
disclosure 
It is generally used to 
proxy for higher level 
of disclosure quantity 
and/or quality  
Discrete Pros. It is a relatively easy and time-efficient 
variable to construct and can be used for 
large-scale samples.  
Cons. It only divides the sample into two 
mutually exclusive groups where actual 
disclosure can still differ among the members 




They are frequently 
used to proxy for the 
quality of disclosure 
Discrete or 
continuous 
Pros. These measures are easily obtainable 
from databases and can be used for large 
samples. Also, they can be constructed using 
both discrete and continuous variables.  
Cons. However, these measures usually suffer 
from a lack of theoretical casual path linking 
them with disclosure and are likely to be 
noisy measures of disclosure. 
Disclosure 
surveys 
They are usually used 
to proxy for disclosure 
quantity and quality 
Discrete Pros. Disclosure scores are ready-made by 
professional analysts and can be obtained for 
sizable samples. 
Cons. The scores reflect analysts’ perceptions 
about firms’ disclosure policies, rather than 
direct investigation of actual disclosure 
practices. Analysts’ ratings are profoundly 
geared towards large firms. This approach is 
subject to measurement bias because the 
disclosure score created could capture not 
only the disclosure practice of a company but 
also its fundamental characteristics and 
performance.  
*These measures share some common cons such as a reduced-form research design and their relationship with 
disclosure could be bidirectional.
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Table 6. The extent of conducting reliability and validity tests in prior studies 
This table shows a list of the studies that have conducted some sorts of reliability and validity testing on their 
measures of disclosure, so studies that have not explicitly done so are not listed in this table. 
 
Test  Disclosure Index  Textual analysis/ Textual 
Sentiment Analysis 
Other Measures of 
Disclosure  




Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005); 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006); 
Al-Shammari, Brown, and Tarca 
(2008); Cheung et al. (2010); 
Cormier, Aerts, Ledoux, and 
Magnan, (2010); Melis et al. 
(2015); Mangena et al. (2016).  
Linsley and Shrives (2006); 
Abraham and Cox (2007); 
Boesso and Kumar (2007); 
Hooghiemstra (2010); 
Miihkinen (2012); Chen et al. 
(2017a).  






(2006); Hollander et 
al. (2010); Plumlee 
and Yohn (2010). 
Internal 
consistency 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006); 
Lapointe–Antunes et al. (2006); 
Kelton and Yang (2008); 
Cormier et al. (2010); Hassan et 
al. (2009).  
Abraham and Cox (2007); 





Ansah and Yeoh (2005); Cheng 
and Courtenay (2006); Lim et al. 
(2007); Orens and Lybaert 
(2007); Patelli and Rencipe 
(2007); Al-Shammari et al. 
(2008); Francis et al. (2008); 
Webb et al. (2008); Çürük 
(2009); Hodgdon et al. (2009); 
Sutthachai and Cooke (2009); 
Al-Akra, Eddie, and Ali (2010a; 
2010b), Melis et al. (2015); 
Bazrafshan et al. (2016). 
Linsley and Shrives (2006); 
Abraham and Cox (2007); 
Boesso and Kumar (2007); 
Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, 
and Segal (2010); Sun (2010); 
Miihkinen (2012); Merkley 
(2014); Brochet et al. (2015).   




Melis et al. (2015). Boesso and Kumar (2007); 
Grüning (2011); Ernstberger 
and Grüning (2013).  
Beneish, Billings 
and Hodder (2008). 
Construct 
validity 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006); 
Lapointe–Antunes et al. (2006); 
Guedhami and Pittman (2006); 
Patelli and Rencipe (2007); 
Francis et al. (2008); Mangena et 
al. (2016). 
Li (2010b); Brown and Tucker 
(2011); Grüning (2011); 
Ernstberger and Grüning 
(2013); Kravet and Muslu 
(2013); Blanco, Lara, and Tribó 
(2014); Brochet et al. (2015); 
Chen, et al. (2015); Elshandidy 
et al. (2015); Filzen and 
Peterson (2015). 
Gu and Li (2007); 
Wang (2007); Files 
(2012).  
*. These include classification approach, disclosure count and market-based disclosure measures. References in italic are 
examples of textual sentiment analysis. 
 
